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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 28 FEBRUARY 1977 NUMBER 4
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
AND THE FORGOTTEN FIRST
AMENDMENT
JAMES E. BOND*
Constitutional law doctrines ebb and flow. As Justice Frank-
furter explained:
[in the study of the] evolution of social policy by way of judicial
application of Delphic provisions of the Constitution, recession
of judicial doctrine is as pertinent as its expansion.'
Although I am not a labor lawyer, I do see, as a student of consti-
tutional law, the alternate expansion and contraction of constitu-
tional principles through whose application the Supreme Court
has sought to resolve labor law problems. For example, the free-
dom of contract principle, once construed to prohibit legislative
restraints on the terms and conditions of employment contracts, 2
has been drained of most of its substantive content. At the same
* Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law; A.B., Wabash
College, 1964; LL.B., Harvard University, 1967; LL.M., University of Virginia, 1971;
S.J.D., University of Virginia, 1972.
1. Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARv. L. REV. 217, 231
(1955).
2. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908):
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in
its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the
conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell
it. . . . In all such particulars the employer and the employee have equality of
right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference
with the liberty of contract which no government can legally justify in a free
land.
3. By 1944 the Court had so refined its earlier interpretations of the contract clause
that one commentator observed: "[The results might be the same if the contract clause
was dropped out of the Constitution, and the challenged statutes all judged as reasonable
or unreasonable deprivations of property [under the due process clause]." Hale, The
Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: III, 57 HARv. L. REV. 852, 890 (1944). See also
Justice Black's dissent in El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965), where he protested
1
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time, the equal protection principle, which Justice Holmes dis-
missed contemptuously in 1927 as the "usual last resort of Consti-
tutional arguments,"' has been expanded enormously. And in at
least one area the application of the equal protection principle
has produced the same result reached under the old freedom of
contract principle: the expanded concept of equal protection pre-
cludes the legislative imposition of discriminatory restraints on
the terms and conditions of employment contracts.' Still another
of the recently expanded principles of constitutional law-the
freedom of association principle-may also produce results simi-
lar to those reached under some of the earlier freedom of contract
cases when it is applied, as it inevitably must be, to the labor
relations field.
In the succeeding sections of this article several points will
be discussed. First, the freedom of association principle, 7 what-
the Court's interpretation of Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934),
as "practically read[ing] the Contract Clause out of the Constitution." 379 U.S. at 523.
4. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). As late as 1949 Justice Jackson defined the scope
of the equal protection doctrine very narrowly. In Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) Justice Jackson noted in a concurring opinion: "Invocation of
the equal protection clause,. . .does not disable any governmental body from dealing with
the subject at hand." Id. at 112. He added that the clause only prohibited the government
from imposing different treatments "except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly
related to the object of regulation." Id. The classic survey of the pre-Warren Court equal
protection doctrine is Tussman & ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALiF.
L. REV. 341 (1949).
5. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 111-24
(1969). The expansion of the equal protection doctrine is reviewed sympathetically in
Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telephase of Substantive Equal Protection,
1967 SuP. CT. REV. 39, and Karat, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the
Return of the 'Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula' 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 716 (1969). Justice
Harlan, in his dissent in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969), sharply criticized
the expansion of the equal protection doctrine. E.g., Gunther, Forward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1972). Professor Gunther interprets the trend as an expansion of the traditional
"rational basis" test. Some observers now perceive a subtle retreat from the expanded
concept of equal protection.
6. See generally Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973).
7. The freedom of association principle, as used in this paper, means that individuals
are free to enter into cooperative relationships voluntarily. It necessarily implies that no
one may force another into any relationship, however beneficial that relationship might
be to either or both parties. Of course, one who insists upon compliance with specific
conditions before entering into association with another does not thereby force that other
person into an association prohibited by the freedom of association principle so long as
the latter person is free not to comply. Thus a worker may insist as a condition of accepting
an offer of employment that he be represented by a particular representative. Or an
employer may insist that the worker agree to be represented by a particular representative
2
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ever its constitutional paternity, is now treated by the Court as
one among first amendment equals. It is thus a fundamental right
which the government may limit only for the most compelling
reasons and then only in that way which least intrudes upon its
exercise. Second, the relationship of an employee both to his
employer and to his fellow employees involves associational
rights of the kind guaranteed and protected by the first amend-
ment. Third, the exclusive representation rule' of the National
Labor Relations Act seriously interferes with those associational
rights for reasons that cannot be fairly characterized as compel-
ling. Moreover, the exclusive representation rule, hardly the least
intrusive means by which the government might solve the prob-
lems allegedly mitigated by its observance, may in fact exacer-
bate those very problems. Consequently, fourth, the Court should
strike down the exclusive representation rule as an abridgement
of both employees' and employers' freedom of association rights
under the first amendment. The freedom of association principle
at full tide will thus sweep legal doctrine back to the high water
mark reached before the freedom of contract principle began to
ebb.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
PRINCIPLE
No clause in the Bill of Rights expressly guarantees freedom
of association, and the Court has only recently recognized that it
nevertheless exists in the interstices of the first amendment In
view of the colonial tradition of voluntary association-a tradi-
tion that has led a number of observers to characterize this
as a condition of the offered employment. In either case, the other party remains free to
reject the condition and seek or offer employment elsewhere.
8. Labor Management Relations (Wagner) Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). The
exclusive representation rule provides that whenever a majority of workers in a designated
bargaining unit agree to be represented by a particular union, then that union becomes
the bargaining agent for all the employees within the unit.
9. NAACP v. Alabama,357 U.S. 449 (1958), is generally conceded to be the first case
in which the Court recognized freedom of association as a separate and distinct first
amendment right. However, earlier cases had mentioned or vaguely suggested its exist-
ence. See Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225
(1956); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); AFL v. American
Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 543 (1949) (Frankfurter, J,, concurring).
19771
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country as "a nation of joiners"'"-the Court might more accur-
ately have found the right among those "others retained by the
people."" The Court's persistent refusal to give significant sub-
stantive content to the strictures of the ninth amendment is, of
course, a matter of historic record,"2 and its preference for a first
rather than ninth amendment elucidation of the freedom of asso-
ciation right was predictable.
The Court might also have construed the word "liberty" to
include freedom of association.'3 Liberty has been defined as
"freedom from external restraint or compulsion; power to do as
one pleases,"" a definition which would embrace the right to
enter into voluntary relationships with others. The modern Court,
however, has generally considered the liberty which is guaranteed
in the fifth and fourteenth amendments as a shorthand expres-
10. Schlesinger, Biography of a Nation of Joiners, 50 AM. HIST. REv. 1 (1944), de
Tocqueville had observed a century before: "In no country in the world has the principle
of association been more successfully used or applied to a greater multitude of objects than
in America." A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 191 (Bradley ed. 1956). In Wie-
man v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion called
the right of association "peculiarly characteristic of our people." Id. at 195. Professor
Emerson begins his classic article Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74
YALE L.J. 1 (1965), with the assertion: "Freedom of association has always been a vital
feature of American society."
11. Justice Douglas reminds us, for example, that "[iun the beginning we had our
Committees of Correspondence." Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 CoLual. L. REV.
1361, 1373 (1963). John Locke, whose work so influenced the colonists, held that the
individual had an inalienable right of association. See generally J. LOCKE, A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION (rev. ed. 1948).
12. B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NIrH AMENDMENT (1955). But see Justice Gold-
berg's concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965): The language
and history of the ninth amendment reveal that the
Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental
rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those
fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional
amendments.
Id. at 488.
13. Justice Harlan, who never accepted the incorporation argument, did not construe
"liberty" in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (though he muddled the exact
source from which he derived the right to association by coupling his definition of liberty
with the observation that it embraced freedom of speech, thereby implying that freedom
of association was subsumed within the free speech guarantee). Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (Liberty "denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right . . . generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."). Professor Emerson has con-
cluded: "Associational rights, to the extent they exist, are not derived solely from the First
Amendment. Rather they are implied in the whole constitutional framework for the pro-
tection of individual liberty in a democratic society." Emerson, Freedom of Association
and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L. J. 1, 5 (1964).
14. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1424 (2d ed. 1936).
4
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sion for those specific rights enumerated elsewhere in the Consti-
tution.'" Thus considered, liberty does not include the right to
associate freely unless that right is fairly deducible from some
other specified right. Since freedom of association may plausibly
be deduced from specific first amendment rights,"6 the Court
again predictably chose to focus on it as the source of the right.
Locating freedom of association in the first amendment has
generated some definitional problems because traditional first
amendment interpretations initially hampered its elaboration.'
7
For example, the Court first hinted that freedom of association
did not extend beyond insuring freedom of assembly.'8 Later the
Court intimated that only those who associate for political or
religious purposes might invoke the first amendment guarantee
of freedom of association.'9 On the whole, however, the Court has
15. Justice Black, of course, was the foremost proponent of "incorporation." Al-
though a majority of the Court has never agreed with his argument that the fourteenth
amendment embraces all (but only) those rights specifically enumerated in the first eight
amendments, it has virtually acquiesced in that interpretation. One surmises that only a
reluctance to fasten upon the states the jury amount of the seventh amendment and the
grand jury requirement of the fifth amendment has prevented the Court from explicitly
adopting Justice Black's incorporation theory.
16. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960).
17. For example, Mr. Robison in Protection of Association from Compulsory Dis-
closure of Membership, 58 COLUM. L. Rav. 614, 621-22 (1958), argued for "liberty" as the
source of the right because its definition might otherwise be restricted to auxiliary elabora-
tion of specific first amendment rights.
18. Cf. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) ("[Pleaceable assembly for
lawful discussion cannot be made a crime."). See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181
(1972) ("While the freedom of association is not explicitly set out in the [first] Amend-
ment, it has long been held to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly, and peti-
tion."); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 528 (1960) (Black & Douglas, J.J.,
concurring) ("One of those rights, freedom of assembly, includes of course freedom of
association; and it is entitled to no less protection than any other First Amendment
right.").
19. Mr. Justice White sympathetically summarized the precedents on this point of
view in his dissent in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967):
If men may speak as individuals, they may speak in groups as well. If they
may assemble and petition, they must have the right to associate to some
extent. In this sense the right of association simply extends constitutional pro-
tection to First Amendment rights when exercised with others rather than by
an individual alone. In NAACP v. Alabama, the Court said that the freedom to
associate for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is constitutionally protected
and that it is "immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by associa-
tion pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters. . ... " 357 U.S.
449, 460 (1958). That case involved the propagation of ideas by a group as well
as litigation as a form of petition. The latter First Amendment element was also
involved in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Railroad Trainmen v.
Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); and United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn.,
ante, p. 217. The activities in Eastern R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
5
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construed the right expansively without establishing parameters
as to its scope. For example, when asked to limit first amendment
protections to political activities in United Mineworkers v. Illi-
nois Bar Association,20 the Court responded that "the First
Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only to the
extent it can be characterized as political."' Furthermore, the
Court has recognized association claims in other nonpolitical con-
texts.22
Even in the bulk of freedom of association cases in which the
associational claim arose in a political context, the Court fre-
quently has expressly defined the right in terms outside of a nar-
row political context. In NAACP v. Alabama,2s for instance, Jus-
tice Harlan said pointedly that "it is immaterial whether the
beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political,
economic, religious or cultural matters .... -24 Justice Douglas,
in a concurring opinion in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investiga-
tion Committee,25 echoed the foregoing conclusion of the more
conservative Justice Harlan by asserting that "the associational
rights protected by the first amendment are . . . much broader
and cover the entire spectrum in political ideology as well as in
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), although commercially motivated, were
aimed at influencing legislative action. Whether the right to associate is an
independent First Amendment right carrying its own credentials and will be
carried beyond the implementation of other First Amendment rights awaits a
definitive answer. In this connection it should be noted that the Court recently
dismissed, as not presenting a substantial federal question, an appeal challeng-
ing Florida regulations which forbid a Florida accountant from associating in
his work, whether as partner or employee, with any nonresident accountant;
out-of-state associations are barred from the State unless every partner is a
qualified Florida acccountant, and in practice only Florida residents can become
qualified there.
Id. at 283 n.1. See also Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 10 (1964)
(Clark, J., dissenting).
20. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
21. Id. at 223.
22. See Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (association for social purposes);
United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971) (association for the
prosecution of personal injury claims); Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of City of Durham, 386
U.S. 670, 674 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) (association by tenants for protection of
housing rights); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (association within the
marital relationship); and Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1
(1964) (association to help employees assert legal claims).
23. 357 U.S. 449 (1948).
24. Id, at 460.
25. 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
6
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art, in journalism, in teaching, and in religion."2 The Court's
refusal to limit the right of association to political affairs is con-
sistent with (and arguably dictated by) its analogous refusal to
limit other first amendment rights such as free speech, free press,
and the right to assemble to political affairs.'
Although the precise scope of the right of association may be
uncertain, it is indisputably a first amendment right,2 and like
other first amendment rights, it is thus both fundamental and
preferred. 29 de Tocqueville perceived how fundamental the right
of association was to freedom:
The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting
for himself, is that of combining his exertions with those of his
fellow creatures and of acting in common with them. The right
of association appears to me almost as inalienable in its nature
as the right of personal liberty. No legislator can attack it with-
out impairing the foundations of society. 0
And Harold Laski recognized, before the Supreme Court did, that
the right to associate freely is a fundamental right in any demo-
cratic society.
31
26. Id. at 565 (Douglas, J., concurring).
27. In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), the Court noted:
Great secular causes, with small ones, are guarded. The grievances for redress
of which the right of petition was insured, and with it the right of assembly, are
not solely religious or political ones. And the right of free speech and a free press
are not confined to any field of human interest.
Id. at 531.
28. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 543 (1963).
("[Rlights of association are within the ambit of the constitutional protections afforded
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."); Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296
(1961) ("[Freedom of association is included in the bundle of First Amendment rights
made applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960) ("[Ilt is now beyond
dispute that freedom of association . . . is protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the states.").
29. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) ("freedom of association ranks among
our most precious freedoms"). Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372
U.S. 539, 544 (1963) ("The First and Fourth Amendment rights of free speech and free
association are fundamental and highly prized, and 'need breathing space to survive'.");
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960) (the "right of free association . . . lies at the
foundation of a free society."); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 237, 250 (1957) ("Our
form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to engage
30. A. DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 196 (Bradley ed. 1948).
31. H. Laski, Freedom of Association, VI ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 477-
50 (1931); accord Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963) (dictum) (freedom of
association is a fundamental right); Solter, Freedom of Association-A New and Funda-
7
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Such rights, though not absolute may not usually be
abridged or infringed.3 2 Any legislation that does so carries an
enormous burden of justification. First, it must meet some com-
pelling need.3" Second, it must satisfy that need in the manner
that demonstrably intrudes least upon the exercise of the right.34
mental Civil Right, 27 GEO. L. REv. 653, 672 (1959) (where Solter claims that a "reading
of NAACP v. Alabama in conjunction with Sweezy v. New Hampshire ... affords more
than adequate support for the conclusion that the new freedom of association is a cognate
of these first amendment freedoms and enjoys coordinately their preferred status."). But
see Note, Freedom of Association: Constitutional Right or Judicial Technique?, 46 VA. L.
REv. 730 (1960) (freedom of association is not an independent constitutional right but
simply a new judicial technique for restraining a particular kind of arbitrary government
action).
32. The courts have sustained numerous laws that regulate associations, such as
registration and disclosure statutes. These cases are analogous to those court decisions
permitting "Roberts Rules of Order" regulation of speech and assembly rights. Indeed,
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§401-531 (1970),
constitutes, in the words of one observer, "an extraordinary amount of governmental
intervention into the affairs of voluntary associations." This perhaps unjustified intrusion
would be largely unnecessary, of course, if the government did not reinforce union compul-
sion in the first place.
Freedom of association is not absolute in yet another sense, for it does not prevail
against the assertion of a compelling state interest. See Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72
(1959) (a state government's interest in self-preservation outweighs tenuous individual
rights in associational privacy). There are doubtless numerous situations in which a gov-
ernment might justifiably assert a compelling interest in either prohibiting or compelling
association. The state's interest in national defense would presumably sustain a compul-
sory draft. The state's interest in the integrity of its judicial system is probably compelling
enough to justify the traditional bar prohibiting a judge from associating with litigants.
Even in such cases, the state must of course draw its regulations as narrowly as possible.
See Arciniego v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4 (1971) (parole prohibitions on personal associations
may not be unduly restrictive).
33. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963)
("lit is an essential prerequisite to the validity of an investigation which intrudes into
the area of constitutionally protected rights of. . . association . . . that the State con-
vincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of
overriding and compelling state interest."); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)
("The decisions of this Court have consistently held that only a compelling state interest
in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify
limiting First Amendment freedoms."); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524
(1960) ("Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the state may
prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling.").
34. United States v. Rbel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967) ("[W]hen legitimate legislative
concerns are expressed in a statute which imposes a substantial burden on protected First
Amendment activities, Congress must achieve its goal by means which have a 'less drastic'
impact on the continued vitality of First Amendment freedoms."); NAACP v. Button, 376
U.S. 415, 438 (1963) ("Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect
... . Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in area[s] so closely touching our
most precious freedoms."); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ("[E]ven though
the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved.").
8
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While the Court often submissively defers to any arguably ra-
tional legislative judgment in other areas,35 it vigilantly guards
against even putatively rational legislative infringements of
"fundamental" or "preferred" freedoms such as the freedom of
association." Indeed, the Court has recently reminded authorities
that if they seek to limit associational freedoms, they must bear
the burden of proving the necessity for the limitation.37 Judged
by such stringent standards, the legislation in question usually
fails." Indeed, the Court has repeatedly struck down legislation
based on claims of national security when it abridged associa-
tional rights. 9 Only when the Court inexplicably fails to apply its
35. The Court has since 1937 consistently sustained state legislation against claims
that it violated property rights or infringed upon "economic" rights. Professor McCloskey
traces this development in Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhuma-
tion and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34. Some observers are now questioning the wisdom
of the Court's permissive attitude which has created a state of judicial laissez-faire con-
cerning state legislative regulation of economic interests: the state may do whatever it
wishes in the "economic" sphere.
36. In contrast to its permissive attitude toward "economic" legislation, the Court
has looked increasingly askance at state (as well as federal) legislation that infringes upon
"fundamental" rights. While the cases discussed at notes 26-27 and accompanying text
supra, are all association cases, the analytical framework which they reflect is identically
reflected in other cases in which the Court has dealt with first amendment rights other
than freedom of association. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (compelling state
interest required to justify infringement of first amendment right to freedom of worship);
Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (least restrictive means test required where
statute may violate establishment clause in furtherance of some legitimate state activity).
In many of the cases in which the Court reversed the conviction of protesters for violating
trespass and other general statutes, the Court was, in effect, applying a least restrictive
means test. See Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (a statute making it a criminal
offense for "three or more persons to assemble. . . on any of the sidewalks. . . and there
conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by" was struck down because
it was unconstitutionally vague and violated petitioners' right to freedom of association);
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 143 (1966) (The state "may not invoke regulations as
to use-whether they are ad hoc or general-as a pretext for pursuing those engaged in
lawful, constitutionally protected exercise of their fundamental rights."); Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963) ("We do not review in this case criminal convic-
tions resulting from the evenhanded alplication of a precise and narrowly drawn
regulatory statute evincing a legislative judgment that certain specific conduct be limited
or proscribed."). As the Court explained in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963):
"[W]e cannot assume that in its subsequent enforcement, ambiguities will be resolved
in favor of adequate protection of First Amendment rights."
37. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
38. Referring to the Court's use of the compelling interest/least restrictive means test
in equal protection cases, Professor Gunther characterized the scrutiny as "strict in theory
and fatal in fact." Gunther supra note 5, at 8.
39. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (A statute which prohibited any
member of a Communist-action organization from working at any defense facility cannot
be justified on grounds of national defense if it infringes too broadly on first amendment
9
Bond: The National Labor Relations Act and the Forgotten First Amendmen
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
own constitutionally mandated analysis, as in several labor cases,
does legislative infringement of associational rights usually pre-
vail.40
The Court's "inexplicable" failure to judge the constitution-
ality of the National Labor Relations Act's (NLRA) exclusive
representation rule by the traditional first amendment tests prob-
ably stems from its initial perception of the NLRA as a species
of "economic" legislation.4' As already pointed out, the Court
has, since the judicial revolution of the late 1930's, refused to
apply the least restrictive means test to "economic" legislation.
Indeed, it has even refused to pass upon the actual rationality of
"4economic" legislation. As the Court reduced to the vanishing
point its scrutiny of economic legislation, it intensified its scru-
tiny of political and social legislation that touched upon first
amendment and other fundamental rights.4 2 Consequently, the
Court must necessarily categorize challenged legislation as either
"economic" or "socio-political" before it knows by which stan-
dard to judge its constitutionality.
All legislation, however, cannot be neatly divided into such
categories. The NLRA is a prime illustration. It is admittedly
"economic" legislation, but it is also political and social legisla-
tion. Thus the Justices cannot honorably escape their obligation
rights.); accord, Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (A statute which
forbade a member of a Communist organization from securing and using his passport was
unconstitutional even though it was passed to protect national security because it in-
fringed too broadly on association rights.). But see Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203
(1961), where the Court upheld the constitutionality of the membership clause of the
Smith Act over the vigorous dissents of Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan, who pro-
tested that the statute violated petitioner's first amendment rights, including his right to
associate freely. The Scales case thus reaffirms the previously conceded point that the
right of association is not an absolute right. In Scales the Court insisted that the statute
was narrowly drawn to reach the particular evil which Congress could legitimately regu-
late. Moreover, it suggested that some associations (in this case "a combination to pro-
mote [the overthrow of the government by violent means], albeit under the aegis of what
purports to be a political party") are not protected by the first amendment. Id. at 229.
This approach bears a close relationship, of course, to the Court's occasional isolation of
some kinds of speech-e.g., fighting words, libel and slander, and obscenity-as unworthy
of first amendment protection. Associations in the labor relations context, however, pre-
sumably would fall within the category of protected associations unless the Court wished
to retreat to some of the very early cases which treated unions as criminal conspiracies.
40. The principal labor cases in this area (which are discussed at length at notes 61-
69 and accompanying text infra) are Railway Employees Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225
(1956) and International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
41. In Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) the Court generally
deferred to legislative judgment instead of invoking the strict scrutiny standard.
42. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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to judge the constitutionality of the Act's infringement of associa-
tional rights by treating it as if it were exclusively "economic"
legislation.
IX. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION PRINCIPLE
TO EMPLOYEE-EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE-EMPLOYER RELATIONSHIPS
Freedom of association may prove the most comprehensive
of the first amendment rights. It would guarantee the right to
worship according to the dictates of one's conscience even without
the free exercise clause. 3 Similarly, it would subsume the right
to assemble peaceably." Whereas most of the other first
amendment rights prohibit government intervention in specified
areas such as the establishment of churches or the presentation
of grievances, freedom of association insulates from government
intervention the whole range of unspecified but voluntary rela-
tionships. The youngest of the first amendment rights, the right
of association, has not yet matured to the full extent of its poten-
tial, but its promised breadth has startling implications.
The average individual makes literally dozens of associa-
tional decisions daily, many of which occur in a work context. The
decision to accept an offer of employment itself necessarily con-
stitutes a two-fold decision to associate: first, to associate himself
with his employer and, second, to associate himself with his fel-
low employees, at least to the extent of working beside them.
Since voluntary interaction constitutes the core of any associa-
tional relationship, the employer-employee relationship is asso-
ciational even though one is subordinate to and paid for his ser-
vices by the other. An individual may choose to work for one em-
ployer or not at all, or he may choose to work for employer Smith
rather than employer Jones. The employee's decision may well
turn on the kind of peculiarly private judgments that the right of
freedom of association protects: personal preferences about col-
leagues, environment, and general working conditions. Similarly,
the employer remains free to hire Bob or Jim, or neither, and his
decision may also reflect personal judgments upon which he is
43. E.g. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 562 (1963)
(Black, J., concurring) ("[Jloining a lawful organization, like attending a church, is an
associational activity . . ").
44. E.g. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (statute which prohibited assem-
blies was found unconstitutional because it denied associational rights).
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entitled to act under his right of free association."
Beyond the initial employment decision, the worker must
also make decisions about the degree to which he will associate
with his fellow employees, since associations range from distant
to intimate. Will he chat with them at lunch? Will he join the
office bowling team? Will he contribute to the collection for an
injured fellow employee's family? And, yes, will he organize with
his fellow employees" and maintain a common position vis a vis
their mutual employer?
Although the workers' right to organize is now implicitly au-
thorized by statute," the freedom of association principle would
guarantee it even in the absence of statutory authorization.4s
45. An employer may hire employees for any number of reasons other than their
competence. He might, for example, hire someone because he was the son of a friend, or
he might decide not to hire someone because he felt that the prospective employee would
not get along with him or the other employees. These are essentially private, subjective
judgments whose exercise the right of association protects in other contexts.
46. The urge to join a union, in [the early 1900's] as in other periods, came
not only from expectation of economic gain through collective action. The hope
that he would attain greater security-a square deal and protection from arbi-
trary discipline-was always highly important, but there was also an often un-
conscious desire on the part of the individual wage earner to strengthen his
feeling of individual worth and significance in an industrial society. Machinery
was more and more making the worker an automatic cog in a process over which
he had no influence or control. The complete impersonality of corporate busi-
ness, with mangement far removed from any direct contact with employees,
further accentuated this loss of individual status. The wage earner could find a
satisfaction in membership in such a meaningful social organization as a labor
union that was denied him as one among many thousands of depersonalized
employees. The desire to take part in some group*activity was, indeed, particu-
larly strong during the progressive era. It was a period marked by the rapid
growth of social clubs, lodges, and fraternal associations. The unions, often
including some of the ritual of the fraternal lodges, met a very real need entirely
apart from the support they provided for collective bargaining.
F. DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA 205 (1949).
47. Labor Management Relations (Wagner) Act § 7 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1970).
48. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) ("[E]mployees
have as clear a right to organize and select their representatives for lawful purposes as
the respondent has to organize its business and select its own officers and agents."). See
also American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921)
("[LIabor unions ...when instituted for mutual help and lawfully carrying out their
legitimate objects. . . have long been thus recognized by the courts."); Brown v. Stoerkel
& Gregory, 74 Mich. 269, 276, 41 N.W. 921, 923 (1889) ([A]n unincorporated local of the
old Knights of Labor "was purely a benevolent and social organization, having also in view
the protection, benefit, and welfare of its members in their various employments. It must
now be considered as well settled that persons have a right to enter into such associations,
and to bind themselves as to their membership and rights in such societies .... ").
Several lower federal courts have expressly held that the freedom of association principle
guarantees workers the right to organize as against the state. A.F.S.C.M.E. v. Woodward,
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Thus, the courts have agreed that the freedom of association
principle does protect the workers' right to organize in occupa-
tions not covered by the NLRA.49 Unfortunately, the courts have
not yet made as clear that the freedom of association principle
also necessarily guarantees the individual's right not to associate.
For example, the mere fact that one has decided to associate with
his fellows by accepting common employment with them does not
mean that he has thereby committed himself to any more inti-
mate association with them. Again, reflection upon analogous
first amendment problems may illuminate the point.
The decision to enter a particular worship hall does not obli-
gate the individual to participate in any or all phases of the
service. He may or may not join in singing a hymn; he may or may
not take communion. The Constitution guarantees him free
choice at every decisional point in the exercise of his religious
freedom.A0 Similarly, in the absence of any voluntary agreement
or valid legislative command, one presumably remains free not to
chat, not to join the office bowling team, not to contribute to the
relief fund, and not to join the union. The right not to associate
is as necessary a corollary of the right to associate as the rights
not to speak, not to assemble, not to petition and not to worship
are the necessary corollaries of the other first amendment rights.5'
Just as the government cannot normally command a citizen to
speak, or to assemble, or to petition, or to worship, it cannot
normally command him to associate with others.
406 F.2d 137, 139 (8th Cir. 1969); Melton v. City of Atlanta, Georgia, 324 F. Supp. 315,
318-20 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068,1075-77 (W.D.N.C.
1969).
49. Note, Exemption of Nonprofit Hospital Employees from the National Labor
Relations Act: A Violation of Equal Protection, 57 IowA L. REv. 412, 431-37 (1971); Note,
Constitutional Law-Public Employees-"Freedom of Association" Guarantees Right to
Unionize But Not the Right to Bargain Collectively, 44 TUL. L. REV. 568 (1970).
50. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) ("iN]either a State nor the Federal
Government can constitutionally force a person 'to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion'.").
51. Cf. Bell v. Hill, 123 Tex. 531, 74 S.W. 2d 113 (1934). The court in Bell stated that
a political party. . . is a voluntary association; an association formed of the free
will and unrestrained choice of those who compose it. No man is compelled by
law to become a member of a political party; or, after having become such, to
remain a member. He may join such a party for whatever reason seems good to
him, and may quit the party for any cause, good, bad, or indifferent, or without
cause. A political party is the creation of free men, acting according to their own
wisdom, and in no sense whatever the creation of any department of the govern-
ment.
Id. at 534, 74 S.W.2d at 114.
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Courts in other countries, whose constitutions explicitly
guarantee freedom of association, have uniformly implied from
that guarantee the freedom of disassociation and have held spe-
cifically that union membership may not be compelled. 52 Other
countries which guarantee freedom of association have also ex-
plicitly protected the right of disassociation,5 3 and article 20 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "No one way be
compelled to belong to any association." Mr. Rice, in his book
Freedom of Association,4 argues that the Supreme Court, in sus-
taining the constitutionality of state right-to-work laws,55 "infer-
entially placed the freedom-not to associate on a plane of equality
with the positive freedom to associate."56
While associational rights are infringed upon when compul-
sory association is demanded, such rights may also be violated in
a situation where compelled association is less evident. This is
especially true under the exclusive representation principle, a
rule which is a substantial infringement on associational rights
and not merely a minimal encroachment as some commentators
intimate. ' Since the exclusive representation principle precludes
direct settlement of grievances between the employer and his
unhappy employees, the disgruntled employees must depend
upon their union representative, who may not share their griev-
52. E.g. Educational Co. v. Fitzpatrick, [1961] 2 I.R. 345 (Ireland); Sithararchary
v. Senior Inspector of Schools, [1958] A.I.R. Ajnd. Pra. 78 (India).
53. See generally Casey, Some Implications of Freedom of Association in Labour
Law: A Comparative Survey with Special Reference to Ireland, 21 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 699
(1972).
54. C. RICE, FREEDOM OF AsSOCIATION 88 (1962).
55. Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
Specifically, Justice Black said in this case:
There cannot be wrung from a constitutional right of workers to assemble to
discuss improvement of their own working standards, a further constitutional
right to drive from remunerative employment all other persons who will not or
can not, participate in union assemblies. The constitutional right of workers to
assemble, to discuss and formulate plans for furthering their own self interest
in jobs cannot be construed as a constitutional guarantee that none shall get and
hold jobs except those who will join in the assembly or will agree to abide by
the assembly's plans. For where conduct affects the interests of other individuals
and the general public, the legality of that conduct must be measured by
whether the conduct conforms to valid law, even though the conduct is engaged
in pursuant to plans of an assembly.
Id. at 531.
56. Rice, supra note 54, at 531.
57. For example, Justice Frankfurter characterized the petitioners' associational
claims as "miniscule" in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 818
(1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 28
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ances.,The facts of Emporfium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition
Community Orgahtizatign5 illustrate how the exclusive represen-
tation rule isolates the employee from his employer and prevents
like-minded employees from associating in any common effort
unsanctioned by the union.
A group f black workers felt that their employer discrimi-
nated ag minorities in hiring and promotion policies. Not
satisfied with union efforts on their behalf, they sought to negoti-
ate directly with the company president. In order to reinforce
their demands, the employees picketed the store and distributed
handbills urging consumers not to patronize the store. Although
their actions thus constituted a classic exercise of first amend-
ment freedoms, the Court affirmed the National Labor Rela-
tions Board decision that the employees were properly dis-
charged because their actions would undermine the statutory sys-
tem of bargaining through an exclusive, elected representative.
On the Supreme Court, only Justice Douglas protested against
making "these union members . . . prisoners of the union."59
Similarly, Judge Wyzanski, sitting by designation on the court of
appeals, had perceived the constitutional question raised by any
decision which construed the exclusive representation rule as a
bar to a minority's prosecution of its entitlement to nondiscrimi-
natory treatment.'
Unfortunately, Emporium is not an exceptional case, either
in illustrating the degree to which the exclusive representation
rule infringes upon freedom of association and the other first
amendment rights or in demonstrating how cavalierly the Court
dismisses associational claims in that context. The grant of exclu-
sive authority to represent all workers leads naturally, for exam-
ple, to union demands that all workers be required to join the
union and pay dues since all are said to benefit from union efforts.
In Railway Employees Department v. Hanson,"1 the Court over-
turned the state court's ruling that a union shop agreement de-
prives the employees of their freedom of association, noting that
"[t]he choice by the Congress of the union shop as a stabilizing
force seems to us to be an allowable one.""2 That description-
58. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
59. Id. at 73 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
60. 485 F.2d 917, 933-37 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wyzanski, J., dissenting).
61. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
62. Id. at 233.
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that the Congressional judgment is an allowable one-reflects a
judicial deference characteristic of the Court's decisions on the
constitutionality of "economic" legislation rather than the close
scrutiny with which it usually reviews legislation impinging upon
first amendment freedoms.
Had the Court strictly scrutinized the provisions of the Rail-
way Labor Act at issue in the Hanson case, it would presumably
have had to characterize elimination of the "free rider" as a com-
pelling state interest. It would then have had to conclude that
authorization of the union shop (rather then, say, the simple
imposition of a negotiating fee) 3 constituted the least intrusive
means of eliminating the free rider evil. Such an analysis, though
difficult to sustain either plausibly or persuasively, would at least
have limited Hanson to its peculiar facts. The Court's rationale,
however, suggests "a broad rule of law, one laden with precarious
implications for personal liberty. The rule may be stated thusly:
forced association, confined to mandatory financial support, is
valid whenever the legislature is acting pursuant to its constitu-
tionally authorized powers, and it is not for the judiciary to evalu-
ate the merits of the policy reasons motivating the law making
body." 4
Although Justice Black, in lonely dissent, subsequently repu-
diated any such rule,65 the Court's decision in Lathrop v.
Donohue" reflects a similar rationale. In Lathrop the petitioner
challenged the mandatory fee imposed by the integrated bar of
Wisconsin on the ground that it violated his right of association.
The plurality opinion declined to pass upon the constitutional
issue of whether the integrated bar could compel a member to
support political causes repugnant to him because the record was
63. The Court does intimate that union fees may only be imposed for purposes
"germane to collective bargaining" although such agreements explicitly include initiation
fees and periodic dues, as well as assessments. Id. at 235. Moreover, the Court recognized
that many of the "appellant unions have broad powers to levy assessments for unspecified
purposes." Id. at n. 7. Since the Court refused to inquire into whether such fees where in
fact spent exclusively for collective bargaining purposes, the Hanson case does not present
the case where the union has simply imposed a negotiating fee.
64. Comment, Freedom from Political Association: The Street and Lathrum
Decisions, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 777, 780 (1962).
65. In his Street dissent, Justice Black argues: "The Hanson case did not hold that
railroad workers could be compelled by law to forego their constitutionally protected
freedom of association by participating as union 'members' against their will."
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 787 (1961) (Black, J., dissent-
ing).
66. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
* 436 [Vol. 28
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too vague to permit adjudication. Nevertheless, the Court did
hold that membership and fees could be compelled for "elevating
the educational and ethical standards of the bar. '6 7 Such a con-
clusion can only be sustained on the premise that the legislature
may pursue by any means a legitimate aim-regulation of the
practice of law in this instance.
Justice Douglas, dissenting, sought to distinguish Lathrop
from Hanson, (which opinion he had written for a unanimous
Court) on the ground that the state interest in the latter was
compelling, whereas the state interest in Lathrop was not. How-
ever mistaken Justice Douglas may have been in his factual as-
sessment of the "compellingness" of the state interest in elimi-
nating so-called "free riders," his Lathrop dissent at least recog-
nized the applicability of the traditional first amendment analy-
sis to the NLRA. His concurring opinion in International Associa-
tion of Machinists v. Street,8 discussed below, reinforces this
conclusion although he offers no more evidence there than he did
in Hanson to support his assessment that the state has a compel-
ling interest in eliminating "free riders." Instead, he relies on ipse
dixit: "Some forced associations are inevitable in an industrial
society." 9
At the same time the Court decided the Lathrop case, it
decided a second labor case that explicitly raised issues that the
Court had refused to pass upon in Hanson. Unions use dues for
purposes other than defraying the cost of negotiating collective
agreements and processing grievances. Among such other pur-
poses are lobbying for particular legislation and financing politi-
cal campaigns." Although forcing an individual worker to defray
the cost of bargaining in his behalf might not violate his freedom
of association, forcing him to finance the election of candidates
and the passage of legislation he opposed surely would.7'
What compelling state interest would justify forcing an indi-
vidual to support financially political causes and candidates with
67. Id. at 843.
68. 367 U.S. 740, 775 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
69. Id.
70. See generally D. CADDY, THE HUNDRED MILLION DOLLAR PAYOFF (1974). Justice
Frankfurter summarized the long history of union political involvement in his dissenting
opinion in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. at 797 (1961).
71. See C. RICE, FREEDOM OF AssoCIATIoN 88 (1962). Furthermore, Justice Black
argued in Street against "[c]ompelling a man by law to pay his money to elect candidates
or advocate doctrines he is against .... ." 367 U.S. at 788.
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which he disagrees? Presumably, a "this-is-the-house-that-Jack-
built" argument would be needed: collective bargaining facili-
tates the movement of goods in interstate commerce; strong un-
ions are a necessary prerequisite for collective bargaining; sympa-
thetic legislators and preferential legislation encourage strong
unions; substantial union financial support procures sympathetic
legislators and preferential legislation; and coerced financial con-
tributions from all workers uniquely insures this substantial
union financial support. Even assuming that proponents could
sustain every one of the preceding propositions, they would still
have to show that the end sought here-unions strong enough to
participate effectively in the collective bargaining process-could
not be accomplished by less drastic means.
The Court, however, side-stepped the constitutional issue in
the Street case. Instead, it construed the statute to preclude use
of exacted funds for political purposes to which a member explic-
itly objects, although Mr. Justice Black may have been more
sanguine than correct when he asserted that the majority's analy-
sis necessarily stemmed from its fear that such coerced contri-
butions were unconstitutional. The Court's refusal to recognize
that fact, as it would probably have had to if it had used the
compelling interest/least restrictive means analysis, led to un-
satisfactory results.
While the Court purportedly protected the right of dissenting
union members to withhold financial contributions, its proffered
protection is illusory because of (1) the difficulty of ascertaining
the percentage of any member's dues being used for political
purposes and (2) the "chilling" burden placed on the individual
who can only secure relief by identifying himself and thereby
perhaps subjecting himself to obloquy and ostracism. It is per-
plexing that a Court which has been so sensitive and apprehen-
sive about such "chilling" burdens in other contexts would so
willingly impose them in this one.
One explanation is that the Court stubbornly refuses to
balance such first amendment claims against what it perceives as
Congress' "national labor policy." In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Co." Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority,
did not mince words: "National labor policy. . . extinguishes the
individual employee's power to order his own relations with his
72. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
[Vol. 28
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employer and creates a power vested in the chosen representative
to act in the interest of all employees. 7 3 The Court has certainly
construed the exclusive representation rule to that end: it prohib-
its a willing employee from working for an obliging employer; it
prohibits an aggrieved employee from negotiating directly with
his employer; and it compels the employee to associate with his
fellows, even to the point of requiring him to support causes with
which he disagrees but which a majority of his brethren approve.
The Court has thus insured that section 9(a) of the NLRA fulfills
Mr. Justice Brandeis' prophecy about the closed shop: it has
simply substituted the "tyranny of the employee" for the
"tyranny of the employer.
'7 4
Rather than scrutinize section 9(a) carefully to ascertain
whether it infringes on associational rights, the Court has sought
to accommodate the interests protected by the freedom of asso-
ciation principle and those infringed on by the exclusive represen-
tation rule by developing the fair representation doctrine. The
duty of fair representation, which allegedly insures that the union
will work earnestly on behalf of every employee it is statutorily
authorized to represent, cannot work because differences among
employees are often irreconcilable. 5 Judge Wyzanski identified
just such a conflict in his dissenting opinion to the court of ap-
peals' decision in the Emporium case:
When the minority consists of non-whites who seek for them-
selves what they regard as equality of opportunity, it is to be
expected that their position is, if not hostile to, or at least un-
congenial to, certainly not fully shared by, a majority of whites
in the same unit. Even if we assume that the whites are tolerant,
nay generous, their short-term interest is in conflict with the
short-term interest of the non-whites. Nothing-except perhaps
a philosophy founded upon long-term interests-can eliminate
that basic conflict. Hence it is essentially a denial of justice to
allow the white majority to have the power to preclude the non-
whites from dealing directly with the employer on racial issues
76
73. Id. at 180.
74. A. MASON, BANDEIS, A FREE MAN'S LiFE, 303-04 (1946).
75. The Court has conceded as much: "The complete satisfaction of all who are
represented is hardly to be expected." Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338
(1953). See also Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. Rsv. 601 (1956).
76. Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 938 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (Wyzanski, J., dissenting).
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The range of potential conflicts among employees is enormous
and extends far beyond racial disagreements, though those may
be especially acute. Lacking the wisdom of Solomon, union offi-
cials have discovered that one cannot serve two masters. More-
over, commentators, even those sympathetic with the exclusive
representation rule, concede that employees cannot easily or
effectively enforce the union duty of fair representation." This
guarantee has thus become largely illusory-a promise kept to the
ear of the aggrieved employee but broken to his hope.
Finally, the dissident employee is entitled to exercise his first
amendment rights even if he is mistaken about how his real inter-
ests might best be advanced. On more than one occasion, when
it has denied the employee the right not to associate, the Court
has assuaged its conscience by observing that only through pool-
ing their collective strength can employees hope to gain substan-
tial improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions.78
Implicit in such observations is the conclusion that Congress may
deny the individual associational rights because their exercise
would not in fact benefit him so much as would foregoing their
exercise. Such reasoning, even if correct, is an anathema to tradi-
tional first amendment analysis, which does not judge subjective
beliefs by tests of accuracy or effectiveness.79
The Court also comforts its conscience by pointing out that
every individual union member may participate effectively in
union affairs as a result of Congressional efforts to promote and
insure "industrial democracy." This majoritarian rationale, when
77. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 75, at 634.
78. Most recently in the Emporium case, the Supreme Court offered its own estimate
of the petitioners' likely success if they were permitted to exercise their first amendment
rights:
With each group able to enforce its conflicting demands-the incumbent em-
ployees by resort to contractual processes and the minority employees by eco-
nomic coercion-the probability of strife and deadlock, is high; the likelihood
of making headway against discriminatory practices would be minimal.
420 U.S. at 68-69. As the Court had pointed out earlier:
National labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their eco-
nomic strength and acting through a labor organization freely chosen by the
majority, the employees . . . have the most effective means of bargaining for
improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions.
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
79. Would the Court, for example, seriously entertain an argument that since civil
rights activists had little chance of persuading their fellow citizens to adopt an open
housing law, they could be denied their right to hold a rally in favor of the law? The Court
has, of course, already rejected the argument that a speaker may be silenced simply
because he irritates his audience. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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analyzed under traditional first amendment jurisprudence, is
equally untenable. That argument, to repeat, is that the em-
ployee may be compelled to join or support an organization be-
cause he is entitled to participate democratically in its
deliberation. But first amendment freedoms are the very ones
that are put beyond majoritarian denial.8 0 The minority remains
free to exercise them even though the majority would prefer that
they would not. Thus Congress could not compatibly with the
Constitution pass a law requiring evey citizen to contribute to the
Republican Party. Yet a union may accomplish just that result
because of its status as the exclusive representative of all employ-
ees. Congress could not constitutionally pass a statute forbidding
all employees from picketing or distributing handbills criticizing
their employers. Yet a union apparently has that power, again by
virtue of its exclusive status. The Court has unfortunately forgot-
ten Justice Douglas' admonition that Congress cannot delegate to
a private organization the power to accomplish results constitu-
tionally forbidden to Congress itself.8'
I. THE EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION RULE DOES NOT SERVE ANY
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST AND UNDULY INFRINGES UPON THE
ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES
Section 9 (a) of the NLRA establishes an appropriately certi-
fied union as the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees
within a defined unit. Interpretative Board and court decisions
have established the following propositions, many of which have
already been noted. In any unit where an exclusive bargaining
representative has been designated, an employee cannot go to his
employer, ask him for a raise, more responsibility, a day off, or
discuss grievances with him. Instead, he must act through his
union representative. 82 Even though the employee may not have
80. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("The very
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities. . . . One's. . . funda-
mental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elec-
tions."); accord, Murray v. Curlett, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
81. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. at 777 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring).
82. Technically, the NLRA does permit bilateral nigotiation of grievances:
[A]ny individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances ad-
justed, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the
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voted for the union and even though he may not belong to the
union, he must depend upon the union to press his claims.83 In
exchange for this unwanted and unsolicited representation, the
employee may be compelled to pay dues or fees.8" Similarly, the
employer may not deal with his employees individually, and if he
does so he commits an unfair labor practice. 5 The preceding is
but black letter law, and it is delineated only to emphasize that
section 9(a) on its face and as applied, does infringe upon both
the employer's and employees' freedom of association.
This infringement is rationalized on the ground that exclu-
sive representation will promote industrial peace and stability
and thereby facilitate the flow of goods in interstate commerce."
Congress undoubtedly has the power under the commerce clause,
such power being evolved from Gibbons v. Ogden 7 to the pres-
ent, to require observance of the exclusive representation rule
unless some other provision of the Constitution prohibits that
particular legislative command.8 But in Carter v. Carter Coal
Co.,8 the Court stated:
Much stress is put upon the evils which come from the struggle
between employers and employees over the matter of wages,
working conditions, the right of collective bargaining, etc., and
the resulting strikes, curtailment, and irregularity of production
and effect on prices; and it is insisted that interstate commerce
is greatly affected thereby. . . . [The conclusive answer is
adjustment is not inconsistent with the term of the collective bargaining con-
tract....
Labor Management Relations (Wagner) Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) (emphasis
added). Although a few early cases construed this provision to permit an employee to take
his grievance directly to his employer, it has become a largely meaningless caveat. Most
collective bargaining agreements now specify grievance procedures, and courts consis-
tently hold that employees must pursue their remedies under the grievance procedures.
83. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
84. Railway Employee's Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
85. The Court established this rule very early; J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332
(1944).
86. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Court through
Chief Justice Hughes said: "Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recogni-
tion of the right of employees to self-organization and to have representatives of their own
choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining is often an essential condition of in-
dustrial peace." Id. at 42. Industrial peace and stability are repeatedly said to be the
objectives of the § 9 (a) exclusive representation rule. See, e.g., Western Addition Com-
munity Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
87. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
88. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
89. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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that the evils are all local evils over which the federal govern-
ment has no legislative control."
For as broad as the commerce clause power is, it is not a grant to
which all other constitutional provisions are subordinated.
Indeed, it may in some circumstances be subordinate to other
prevailing constitutional principles.-
Even if Congress rationally concluded that union organizers
fomented industrial unrest by encouraging strikes for better
wages and thereby impeded the movement of goods in interstate
commerce, it presumably could not under the guise of exercising
its commerce clause power prohibit union organizers from moving
across state lines to urge workers to join unions.2 Likewise
Congress presumably could not deny union organizers the use of
the mails for organizational purposes.13 In fact, the freedom of
association principle clearly protects the workers' right to organ-
ize.9 4
The simple point is that any exercise of commerce clause
power which infringes upon first amendment freedoms is consti-
tutionally suspect because those freedoms are "fundamental"
and "preferred." Such exercises of authority survive only if they
serve some compelling state interest in the least intrusive fashion.
As Justice Douglas once observed:
The right of association is an important incident of First
Amendment rights. The right to belong-or not to belong-is
90. Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
91. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) a concurring
opinion set forth that
every remote, possible, speculative effect on commerce should not be accepted
as an adequate constitutional ground to uproot and throw into the discard all
our traditional distinctions between what is purely local, and therefore con-
trolled by state laws, and what affects the national interest and is therefore
subject to control by federal laws.
Id. at 275.
92. Cf. Pittman v. Nix, 152 Fla. 378, 11 So. 2d 791 (1943). The Pittman court found
that an ordinance which made it unlawful to organize a labor union in the town and
prohibited solicitation of union memberships on the streets or in any other public place
impaired "the well settled legal right of employed workers to organize labor unions and
to use their powers of persuasion to induce others to join them, so long as no fraud or
coercion is resorted to." Id. at 384, 11 So. 2d 794-95. See also Staub v. City of Baxley, 355
U.S. 313 (1958) (a city ordinance which required that all persons intending to solicit union
memberships must first obtain a permit, which cost $2,000 plus $500 for every member
obtained, constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom of speech).
93. See, e.g., Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
94. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
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deep in the American tradition. Joining is one method of expres-
sion. This freedom of association is not an absolute. ... Yet
if this right is to be curtailed by law, if the individual is to be
compelled to associate with others in a common cause, then I
think exceptional circumstances should be shown. 95
None of the interests allegedly served by the exclusive repre-
sentation rule is compelling. However desirable industrial peace
and stability may be, its absence from time to time in any given
industry seldom poses any great threat to the nation's welfare.
While a strike at any given plant or in any given industry may
well affect the profits of the particular employers and the welfare
of the particular employees for a specified period, it will generally
have a minimal impact on consumer prices for the goods pro-
duced and a negligible effect on gross national product. The total
number of man-hours lost because of strikes is less than one per-
cent of all man-hours16 Even in those rare instances where strike
activity does appreciably affect the gross national product, the
negative effect stems from the existence of powerful industry-
wide unions that can shut down an entire industry and thereby
preclude the more flexible responses that occur in decentralized
industries hit with strikes. In short, both the incidence and im-
pact of industrial strife have been exaggerated.
Similarly, there is little evidence that union authority will
dwindle to the point of ineffectiveness unless the union is given
the exclusive right to represent all employees. Comparative stud-
ies of union activity in right-to-work and non-right-to-work states
show that right-to-work laws do not adversely affect the growth
of unions, either numerically or percentage wise." The Court it-
self noted in International Association of Machinists v. Street
that railway unions had traditionally refrained from advocating
the union shop because they believed "'that the strongest and
most militant type of labor organization was the one whose mem-
bers were carefully selected and who joined conviction and a de-
sire to assist their fellows in promoting objects of labor unionism
... ,,, The European trade union movement, which is even
stronger than its American counterpart, has not only survived but
95. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 881-82 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
96. See generally H. Miws & R. MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LABOR (1945).
97. Niebank, In Defense of Right-to-Work Laws, 8 LAB. L.J. 459, 460-62 (1957).
98. 367 U.S. at 750 n.6 (quoting C. MacGowan, Transcript of Proceedings, Presiden-
tial Board, appointed Feb. 20, 1943, p. 5358).
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thrived without the legislative grant of exclusive authority to rep-
resent all workers. Moreover, "union effectiveness," however de-
sirable it might be thought to be, is not constitutionally guaran-
teed. If the courts must thus reconcile conflicts between compet-
ing values, one of which enjoys constitutional status while the
other does not, they must prefer the constitutionally protected
value even though Congress has expressed a contrary preference."
Finally, the employer will not likely be harrassed with irre-
concilable demands from various employees if the union is de-
prived of its privileged status as exclusive bargaining agent.
Employers in nonunionized industries, for example, are not beset
with such harassment. Employers and employees in nonunion-
ized industries have developed various methods for handling dis-
agreements and demands, and these methods would presumably
work equally well in industries with unions lacking exclusive au-
thority to represent all workers.
Even if the exclusive representation rule could be shown to
serve a compelling state interest, it cannot be proven to be ration-
ally related to the end sought, let alone the least intrusive means
of accomplishing that end. Little or no empirical evidence sus-
tains the proposition that the exclusive representation rule pro-
motes industrial peace and stability. In order to carry their bur-
den of proof, proponents would have to show, first, that strikes
which impede the flow of goods in interstate commerce occur
more frequently in nonunionized industries and, second, that the
lack of any exclusive representation rule causes those strikes.
This they can scarcely do in a country where less than 25 percent
of the work force is unionized and where few work stoppages occur
in the nonunionized industries. ' Indeed, the exclusive represen-
tation rule may actually foster industrial unrest. By precluding
individuals from settling grievances outside the union-approved
channels, it may lead to "wildcat" strikes or employee dissatis-
faction which will manifest itself in ways that adversely affect
production.' °'
99. The Court's role as the final arbiter of what the Constitution commands is a
mandate as old as Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803). Moreover, it is a function that the Court jealously guards. See, e.g.,
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1958). -
100. DEPT. OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 366 (1974).
101. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Co., 420 U.S 50 (1975).
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IV. THE EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION RULE IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ABRIDGEMENT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO ASSOCIATE FREELY
Unfortunately, the perception that the NLRA generally, and
the exclusive representation rule specifically, infringe upon first
amendment rights has dawned rather late on the Court, and this
may cause the Court to feel trapped within its own unhappy
precedents. However, those precedents scarcely foreclose a reex-
amination of the compatibility of the exclusive representation
rule with the first amendment. Justice Douglas once remarked
that "all constitutional questions are always open."'' 2 But beyond
the fact that constitutional questions are always open, the pre-
cedent may be reassessed and distinguished in light of evolving
constitutional doctrine.
First, the original decisions sustaining the constitutionality
of the NLRA intimated that the individual employee remained
free to bargain with his employer and only later did the Court
depart from the clear implication of those earlier holdings. Sec-
ond, the Court in those later cases did not examine seriously the
evidentiary underpinnings of the argument for the exclusive rep-
resentation rule. Instead, they were accepted at face value. Third,
the Court has recently indicated an unwillingness to accept at
face value legislative assertions. Fourth, the Court committed
itself to the constitutionality of the exclusive representation rule
before it had "discovered" that the first amendment guaranteed
freedom of association, and the Court has never tried to reconcile
these later association cases with the earlier union cases.
Originally, the Court permitted individual negotiation under
the NLRA and that permission was essential to a finding that the
NLRA was constitutional.0 3 The lower federal courts consistently
102. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 336, 346 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring). The
classic statement of the reasons why the doctrine of stare decisis has only limited applica-
tion in the field of constitutional law is Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent in Burnet v. Coro-
nado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932).
103. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937); Precision
Castings Co. v. Boland, 13 F. Supp. 877 (W.D.N.Y. 1936) (exclusive representation provi-
sion permissible because it does not prevent employer from dealing with other employees);
cf. Virginian Ry. Co. v. Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 548-49 (1937) (government conceded that
"[the statute] must be taken to prohibit the negotiation of labor contracts, generally
applicable to employees in the mechanical department, with any representative other
than respondent, but not as precluding such individual contracts as petitioner may elect
to make directly with individual employees").
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adhered to the Jones & Laughlin"4 holding that the employer
remained free under the NLRA to negotiate directly with individ-
ual employees." 5 In J.. Case Co. v. NLRB,'0" however, the Court
refused to give any substantial content to the reservations an-
nounced in Jones & Laughlin and theretofore respected in the
lower courts. The Court declined to review "those cases in detail"
but confidently asserted "that their decision called for nothing
and their opinions contain nothing which may properly be read
to rule the case before us."" 7 Instead the Court, while purportedly
preserving some scope for individual contracts, ruled that such
contracts must yield to any collective agreement or "the Act
would be reduced to a futility." ' Justice Jackson failed, however,
to explain how or why individual contracts would destroy the
NLRA. Over a decade later in the Hanson case, the Court was
still accepting without any serious inquiry the assertion that "the
long-range interest of workers would be better served" by compul-
sory unionism.' 9 Decisions such as these, which rest on ipse dixit
rather than empirical proof, may be overturned if the Court can
be induced to review present evidence which suggest that the
assumptions upon which the conclusions in these cases were
based are factually erroneous.
Although the Court's refusal to scrutinize the rationality of
the exclusive representation rule is arguably consistent with its
"hands-off' attitude toward "economic" legislation, it has never
flatly said it would not judge the substantive validity of such
legislation. In fact, it has almost always coupled its refusals to
scrutinize economic legislation with a rhetorical reservation of
authority to do so in another "appropriate" case." ' Moreover, the
Court has recently given some content to those rhetorical reserva-
tions, as many commentators had urged it to do."'
104. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
105. E.g., Illinois Central R.R. v. Moore, 112 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1940); NLRB v. Sands
Mfg. Co., 96 F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 1938); NLRB v. Union Pac. Stages, 99 F.2d 153, 159
(9th Cir. 1938). But cf. NLRB v. Superior Tanning Co., 117 F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1941).
106. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
107. Id. at 336.
108. Id. at 337.
109. 351 U.S. at 234-35 (1956).
110. See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. Rav. 34.
111. E.g., Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972).
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In James v. Stranger'2 a unanimous court struck down a
Kansas statute for recoupment of fees expended for indigent de-
fendants because the statute lacked any rational relation to its
avowed purpose. Several times in the same term, the Court used
the rational relationship standard to invalidate state legisla-
tion."' In all these cases, the Court resorted to the "rational rela-
tion" standard characteristic of its pre-1935 decision-making. Its
new-found willingness to examine the substantive validity of
''economic" legislation is especially important because its princi-
pal labor decisions were decided during an era when it was unwill-
ing to undertake such an examination. Consequently, the ques-
tions of substantive validity raised in those cases may fairly be
said to remain open.
Additionally, the Court may rely upon the freedom of asso-
ciation cases as authority for its reassessment of the constitution-
ality of the exclusive representation rule. The freedom of associa-
tion cases, which were decided some time after the initial labor
law cases, stand as an alternative line of authority which the
Court may now apply to the labor relations field."' The Court's
treatment of the association right itself has evolved from its early
decisions, which allowed states to interfere with freedom of asso-
ciation on a mere showing of a rationally related interest, to its
later decisions which permit states to interfere only if they can
demonstrate a compelling state interest.115 While the association
cases admittedly arose initially in a political context, their ration-
112. 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
113. E.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Humphrey v. Eady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
114. For example, Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), was
decided two years before the Court "discovered" the right of association in NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The Court did not discuss the freedom of association
doctrine in that case, and Justice Black, dissenting in International Ass'n of Machinists
v. Street, easily distinguished Hanson:
That case [Hanson] cannot, therefore, properly be read to rest on a principle
which would permit government-in furtherance of some public interest, be that
interest actual or imaginary-to compel membership in Rotary Clubs, fraternal
organizations, religious groups, chambers of commerce, bar associations, labor
unions, or any other private organizations . . . . [Tihe Hanson case did not
hold that the existence of union-shop contracts could be used as an excuse to
force workers to associate with people they do not want to associate with ....
367 U.S. at 787.
115. Compare Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S 72 (1959) with Robel v. United States, 389
U.S. 258 (1967). See generally ANNoT., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT
RIGHT OF AssoCIATION, 33 L. Ed. 2d 865, 880 (1972).
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ale is not limited to that context for the first amendment guaran-
tees freedom of association in all contexts. '
The Court may be induced to look more carefully at the
substantive rationality of the exclusive representation rule for
three reasons. In the first place the precedents themselves consti-
tute no insuperable bar. As outlined above, they are sufficiently
malleable to permit a principled reassessment of the currently
prevailing doctrine. Second, the social context in which the
NLRA was passed has changed radically. Unions are no longer
perceived as weak, yet desirable, institutions whose strength
must be succored by benevolent government support."7 They are
now seen as enormously strong institutions whose unchecked ex-
cesses threaten the nation's well-being. Third, there is today a
growing body of scholarship that calls into question many of the
assumptions upon which the NLRA was based."" Thus at the very
time when the Court may be more inclined than at any other time
in the recent past to question facile assertions that unions need
legislative preferments, data suggests that the unions do not need
and have flagrantly abused the special preferences conferred
upon them by Congress. Thus the Court may finally remember
that the first amendment protects individual workingmen and
businessmen too. To paraphrase Justice Fortas' oft-quoted state-
ment in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,"I9 "It
can hardly be argued that either [employees] or [employers]
116. But see C. RICE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (1962).
Whether there shall be compulsory or voluntary unionism is a matter for the
appropriate legislature to decide. It would be desirable for the legislature to
consider the right of association as an advisory, nonconstitutional standard on
this point, and to refrain from infringing upon it without a genuinely compelling
reason.
Id. at 92 (emphasis added).
117. Chief Justice Hughes thus described the plight of the working man in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.:
We said that they were organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a
single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was depen-
dent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family; that
if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was
nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treat-
ment; that union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equal-
ity with their employer.
301 U.S at 33.
118. See W.H. HurT, THE STRIKE THREAT SYSTEM (1973); H. LEWIS, UNIONISM AND
RE.LATIVE WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES: AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY (1963); E. ScHMnIr, UNION
POWER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1973).
119. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
[association] at the [factory] gate."'
20
120. Id. at 506.
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